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UNCERTAINTY AND THE STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF
Douglas Lichtman*
In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts today focus on three factors:
the likelihood that plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits; the harm defendant will
suffer if the injunction is wrongly issued; and the harm plaintiff will suffer if the injunction
is wrongly denied. The idea is to account for the possibility that the court might err in its
prediction on the merits. If wrongful denial would be particularly harmful and there is a
real chance of wrongful denial, the court is more reluctant to deny. By contrast, if wrongful
issuance poses the greater threat, the court is more reluctant to issue. This decision rule has
intuitive appeal but overlooks a key point: In most cases, the court will be just as uncertain
about its estimates of the harms as it is about its prediction as to the outcome of the case.
Thus, the conventional approach begins to unravel. A court cannot minimize the
implications of its possibly errant prediction on the merits by blindly relying on its possibly
errant estimates of relative harm. The optimal decision rule must account for both types of
uncertainty.

I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a lawsuit between two firms over the validity and interpretation of an
issued patent. Plaintiff owns the patent and believes that its rival is making, using, or
selling the claimed invention without permission. Defendant, meanwhile, either believes
the patent to be invalid or believes that the patent, while valid, does not cover the
disputed activity. The case will be definitively resolved once the firms fully litigate it or
settle; but both firms care a great deal about what will happen in the interim.
To that end, plaintiff will likely ask the court to issue a preliminary injunction
barring defendant from engaging in the disputed activity for the duration of the lawsuit.
Defendant’s actions would otherwise undermine the value of the patent; and while money
damages could in theory make up for any such harm after the litigation concludes,
plaintiff will argue that those damages would be so difficult for the court to estimate that
the resulting remedy would be intolerably random. Better to avoid the possible
infringement entirely, or so plaintiff will contend. Defendant will take the opposite
position, arguing that a court order barring its use of the invention will substantially
interfere with its business. Customers will have to be turned away, advertising campaigns
will have to be interrupted, and so on. That is not objectionable if plaintiff eventually
prevails on the merits, but if the patent turns out to be invalid, or if defendant’s actions
turn out not to infringe, those harms will have been wrongly inflicted. Again, money
could in theory compensate, but, as with plaintiff’s possible injury, defendant’s would be
speculative. This would require the court to engage in an exercise in estimation that both
the court and defendant would very much like to avoid.
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Faced with these competing risks of so-called “irreparable” harm, the court will have
to decide whether to issue a preliminary injunction. That decision is the focus of this
Essay. Most courts approach the problem as follows. If the injunction issues and plaintiff
turns out to then lose on the merits, the magnitude of the court’s error will be the
irreparable harm wrongly imposed on defendant. Conversely, if the injunction does not
issue and plaintiff turns out to later win on the merits, the magnitude of the error will be
the irreparable harm wrongly imposed on plaintiff. The injunction should therefore issue,
courts reason, if the probability of the first error weighted by its magnitude is less than
the probability of the second error weighted by its magnitude.1 Phrased another way, the
lower plaintiff’s relative irreparable harm, the greater his obligation to show that he will
ultimately succeed on the merits.2
The stated justification for this conventional approach is that it accounts for and
minimizes the costs of court error.3 Compare the obvious alternative, namely granting the
injunction in any case where plaintiff is more likely than not to prevail. That rule would
minimize the number of errors—if plaintiff is more likely to win than to lose, in most
cases he will win and so the court should issue the injunction—but it would ignore the
fact that some errors are more costly than others. The standard approach thus weighs both
the probability of a mistake and its magnitude, tipping the scales in favor of an injunction
where wrongful denial would be particularly harmful, and tipping against where errant
issuance poses the greater threat.4
The problem with this balancing approach is that it only works if the court has good
information about the relative harms facing the parties. That, however, is unlikely.
Preliminary hearings typically take place early in the course of litigation, long before all
the evidence has been studied or even made available. Worse, as the patent hypothetical
suggests, harms that qualify for preliminary relief are often harms that courts cannot
1

As Judge Posner puts it, the injunction should issue “only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction
is denied, multiplied by the probability that the denial would be an error . . . exceeds the harm to the
defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that granting the injunction would be an
error.” American Hospital Supply Co. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986).
Obviously, this is not meant to encourage courts to engage in mathematical calculations; it is instead meant
only to suggest the appropriate relationship between these various factors.
2
Courts vary in their articulations of this decision rule, but the same basic tradeoff pervades. See, e.g.,
Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973) ("One moving for a preliminary
injunction assumes the burden of demonstrating either a combination of probable success and the
possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply
in his favor"); Midcon Corp. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (N.D. Il., 1986) (“the
magnitude of injury to the plaintiff if the injunction [is] erroneously denied is nearly equal to the injury to
the defendants if the injunction [is] erroneously granted” and so “plaintiff must show a better than 50
percent chance of winning the case”) (quotations omitted). See generally, Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary
Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 109 (2001); Lea Vaughn, A Need for Clarity:
Toward a New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 68 Ore. L. Rev. 839 (1989). Professor John Leubsdorf
was first to make explicit the relationship between the probability of success on the merits and the parties’
relative irreparable harms. See John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
525 (1978). Judge Posner formalized the insight in Hospital Supply Co., 780 F.2d at 593.
3
See, e.g., Roland Mach. v. Dresser Ind., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (“the task for
the district judge in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for preliminary injunction is to minimize
errors”).
4
Note that this increases the likelihood of an errant decision; it is nevertheless assumed to be desirable
on grounds that it decreases the average magnitude of those now more numerous errors.
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reliably estimate no matter what the available evidence. At the preliminary injunction
stage, then, the court is uncertain about both the likely outcome on the merits and the
harms facing each party. The traditional approach errs in that it accounts for only the first
of these two uncertainties. In this Essay, I consider how it might in addition account for
the second.
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I continue the above discussion by offering a fuller
account of the conventional approach to preliminary relief. In Part III, I explain why
uncertainty with respect to the magnitudes of plaintiff’s and defendant’s harms does not
wash out of the analysis. Yes, the court will overestimate in some instances and
underestimate in others, but that does not mean that the correct decision rule is the one
we would use if there were no uncertainty in the first place. Indeed, as I will explain in
some detail, to think that error always washes out is to make a standard mistake, one that
infects all algebraic decision rules, from Learned Hand’s balancing of the costs of
accidents to the familiar cost/benefit analysis employed by administrative agencies.
Finally, in Part IV, I consider implications and avenues for further research.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE
Preliminary relief is typically unavailable in litigation because most harms can be
fully compensated through the use of ex post remedies.5 There is no need for the court to
intervene prematurely in these cases; the court can fully remedy any wrong after a full
hearing on the merits. Preliminary relief is therefore available only in cases where there is
irreparable harm—that is, injuries of such a nature that the injured party cannot be made
whole through an eventual exchange of cash or services. Examples of irreparable harm
include harms for which there can be no substitute, for instance the loss of
companionship with a child or loved one;6 harms for which any ex post remedy would be
too late to have meaningful effect, as where the harmed party is a business teetering on
the edge of bankruptcy;7 and harms that are difficult for the court to reliably measure, for
example harms associated with the unauthorized use of intellectual property.8
These categories frequently blur, often leading back to uncertainty as the dominant
explanation for preliminary relief.9 For example, restrictions on speech are typically
5

The preliminary injunction is thus typically referred to as an “extraordinary” remedy, shorthand for the
notion that damages are the preferred means of court intervention. For the history and a rich discussion, see
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1990).
6
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (harm at stake was temporary
loss of companionship with foster child). That we cannot compensate for a given harm does not mean that
we cannot compare it to other harms. Most people would agree that the loss of a loved one to death is
worse than the loss of a long-term friendship to inattention, although clearly neither is a harm for which
goods or services can easily compensate.
7
See, e.g., Young v. Ballis, 762 F. Supp. 823, 827 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (injunction may issue if "necessary
to save a plaintiff's business from insolvency"); Roland Mach., 749 F.2d, at 386 (same if plaintiff “may go
broke while waiting, or may have to shut down his business but without declaring bankruptcy”).
8
Copyright infringement, for example, is presumed to cause irreparable harm on these grounds in every
circuit but the Fifth. See Cadence Design Sys. v. Avant Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). Mark
Lemley and Eugene Volokh take issue with this presumption in Lemley & Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L. J. 147 (1988), mainly on First Amendment grounds.
9
This is not to say that uncertainty is the only reason courts offer preliminary relief. For example, in
some cases, preliminary relief is appropriate because defendant is likely to be judgment proof by the time
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characterized as if they are harms for which there can be no substitute.10 But that is rarely
the case. A civil rights activist hoping to stage a peaceful demonstration on a particular
Sunday surely would trade away that opportunity if compensated by the funding
necessary to sponsor, say, ten demonstrations the following week or, better yet, a mixture
of demonstrations, public hearings, and other means through which his message might be
heard and thoughtfully evaluated. The real problem with most free speech harms is that
the court has no way of reliably estimating this speech-to-speech tradeoff, and so the
harm is indeed irreparable, but on grounds of uncertainty rather than
incommensurability.11
That raises the question of why uncertainty itself is an accepted basis for preliminary
relief. After all, an uncertain court is just as likely to overpay as it is to underpay, so it is
not immediately obvious that uncertainty makes any particular party better or worse off.
The typical response is that an injured party should not be forced to assume this risk,12
but that at best explains the rule only as it applies to entities that are risk averse. Firms, by
contrast, are typically risk neutral, unless managers and executives feel inadequately
diversified and thus exercise undue caution when making decisions on behalf of their
firms. Intuition might suggest that the real purpose of preliminary relief is to save the
court the time and expense needed to measure harm more accurately. That rationale fails,
however, in that it only explains why courts might leave harms uncertain; it does nothing
to explain why uncertain harms, in turn, justify preliminary relief.
Perhaps a better response is that injunctions facilitate bargaining by establishing
clear property rights.13 If money damages are the expected remedy, the parties might
have different guesses as to how much cash the court will award. Injunctions remove that

the litigation concludes and thus the only remedy realistically available to the court is to issue a preliminary
injunction. In other cases, preliminary relief is appropriate because in its absence there would be a real and
irreversible loss of social value, for instance goodwill that would dissipate thanks to a firm’s inability to
compete during the pendency of litigation. Uncertainty, then, is one of the main justifications, but certainly
not the only one.
10
See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Ed., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11318 (2002), and cases
cited therein. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("Loss of First Amendment freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.")
11
A similar point applies to the threat of bankruptcy. One reason that bankruptcy constitutes an
irreparable harm is that bankruptcy is a financial harm that is difficult to estimate reliably. Harms for which
there can be no substitute have an inherent element of uncertainty, too. In a dispute over the care of a foster
child, for instance, a key feature is that the relative harms and benefits are difficult to predict.
12
See, e.g., Hospital Supply Co., supra note _, 780 F. 2d. at 597 (Posner, J.). On this theory, the
irreparable harm is not the full magnitude of the loss, but the risk premium that the relevant party would
require in exchange for voluntarily assuming the risk.
13
This is an application of Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). A vast literature explores
these issues. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment?: A
Glimpse inside the Cathedral, 66 U Chi L Rev 373 (1999) (arguing that the litigation process generates
such enmity that parties do not bargain around court rulings); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995) (arguing
that liability rules might be preferable even where transaction costs are low); Louis Kaplow & Steve
Shavell, Property Rights and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996)
(criticizing the thesis in Ayres & Talley and suggesting refinements).
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variable from the negotiation, possibly simplifying any attempts at voluntary settlement.14
Here, too, however, there are counter arguments. For one, note that an expected damages
remedy might decrease uncertainty by replacing the parties’ dueling estimates of relative
harm with the parties’ possibly more consistent guesses as to the court’s likely estimate
of that ratio.15
Another response is that injunctions offer an easy way for courts to hide their
uncertainty, a result not attainable via traditional money damages. In a case where a
preliminary injunction issues and the plaintiff goes on to win on the merits, the court’s
uncertainty never appears on the public record. There is no need for the court to
equivocate as to the appropriate measure of plaintiff’s harm because the injunction will
have prevented it. There is similarly no need to speak precisely about defendant’s harm
because, by definition given the outcome of the litigation, there was none. Hiding
uncertainty in this fashion might be in a court’s and also society’s interest. Both benefit
from having the judicial system held in high regard, and public confidence would surely
be diminished if justice were to appear too obviously random.16
Whatever the rationale, courts today frequently recognize uncertain harms as
irreparable and thus must frequently decide whether it is better to grant or deny
preliminary relief. The easy cases are those where only one side can credibly claim
irreparable harm. If plaintiff is the only party at risk, the injunction should issue—
perhaps with the added requirement that plaintiff make some minimal showing that his
lawsuit is plausible rather than pure nuisance.17 Similarly, if the irreparable harm lies
exclusively with defendant, the injunction should not issue, since plaintiff can be made
whole by ex post damages should he ultimately prevail in the litigation. The hard cases
are those in which both sides can credibly claim the risk of irreparable harm.
As outlined in the Introduction, courts in this situation typically approach the
problem by considering both the likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits and
the relative irreparable harm threatening the two parties. Focus first on the likelihood that
plaintiff will succeed. A court could adopt the simple rule that an injunction will issue
whenever plaintiff is more likely than not to win on the merits. For instance, if the court
thinks plaintiff has an 80% chance of prevailing—perhaps the law and evidence thus far
14

Preliminary hearings—whether or not they lead to injunctions—surely do promote settlement by
increasing the information available to the parties. For instance, the parties learn more about how the judge
is approaching the case, and they also have a chance to size up competing counsel. All that, however, is not
so much an argument for preliminary relief as it is an argument for having informative hearings early in the
course of litigation.
15
These competing hypotheses could be tested empirically, for example by comparing (with appropriate
controls) the rates of settlement after the issuance of an injunction with the rates of settlement after the
denial of an injunction.
16
An interesting related question is to ask why plaintiffs so often request preliminary relief and why
defendants so often oppose it. If parties are risk neutral and if damages are not biased up or down,
preliminary relief ex ante and damage remedies ex post should be perfect substitutes. Yet parties clearly
prefer preliminary relief in many cases, which suggests that perhaps injunctive relief does facilitate
settlement, or perhaps that parties believe courts systematically understate or overstate damages. For a
discussion of other possible explanations for why parties request preliminary relief, see Jean Lanjouw &
Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J. Law & Econ. 573, 576-78 (2001).
17
See Cooper v. Bombela, 34 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (1999) (Shadur, J.) (requiring “better than
negligible” chance of ultimate success as prerequisite to standard preliminary injunction inquiry), citing
Boucher v. School Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1998).
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look favorable, but there is still some chance that the defendant will uncover a particular
bit of damaging evidence during discovery—this rule would have the court issue an
injunction. The logic is that this is the best guess the court has about the ultimate outcome
on the merits.
It is likely a pretty good guess, too. Preliminary injunction hearings are real hearings,
and while they are necessarily incomplete, they do offer the court a genuine opportunity
to preview the main arguments and examine important evidence. The hearings expose
other predictive information as well, for instance the relative quality of the lawyering and
the state of the evidentiary record. Moreover, the result of the preliminary hearing often
changes the positions of the parties in ways that make the court’s predicted outcome more
likely. This is at times a psychological effect, as where the judge is subconsciously
influenced by his earlier decision when he later makes rulings, announces jury
instructions, and so on;18 and it is at times just an unavoidable ramification of preliminary
relief, for example where an injunction temporarily entrusts a minor to the custody of one
of two feuding foster families, the unintended consequence being that the minor then
strengthens his or her attachment with that family, thereby changing the case on the
merits.19
Despite all this, courts today do not focus exclusively on their predictions with
respect to the merits. Instead, courts also factor in the relative harms threatening the
parties. The intuition here is that not all mistakes are equally troubling, and so a court
should be willing to increase the likelihood of error if, in so doing, it can decrease the
expected gravity.20 Consider a specific example. Suppose defendant’s irreparable harm is
estimated to be twice the magnitude of plaintiff’s—so, say, plaintiff faces losses of 100
whereas defendant faces loses of 200.21 If plaintiff is 60% likely to win on the merits,
should the court issue the injunction?
18

Similarly, a plaintiff who wins at the preliminary injunction stage might more aggressively pursue the
litigation, and a defendant who defeats a motion for preliminary relief might more aggressively defend. Cf.
Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1516-18
(1998) (same point applied to prosecutors).
There are strategies for minimizing these sorts of psychological biases. For instance, the judge’s
psychological bias could be rendered irrelevant by scheduling litigation such that one judge decides
preliminary matters but then a second judge, unaware of the result in the earlier hearing, actually hears the
case. The cost of this approach would be the obvious lost economy of scale. In the alternative, the
importance of the judge’s bias could be minimized by abandoning the modern decision rule and instead
granting injunctions in any case where the plaintiff is more likely than not to prevail at trial. That rule
maximizes the accuracy of the judge’s initial decision, thus minimizing the number of cases where his
psychological bias weighs in the wrong direction.
19
This is a real concern in family law; see supra note _.
20
Courts focus solely on wrongful losses, but it is hard to understand why that is the right emphasis.
After all, if the point is to minimize deviations from the desired state of the world, errant gains are just as
troubling as errant losses. Where an injunction wrongly issues, then, there are two errors to count: the harm
wrongfully imposed on defendant, and the gain wrongfully bequeathed to plaintiff. Courts count only one
of those two errors, and that seems to raise yet another problem for the conventional approach. For further
discussion, see Douglas Lichtman & John Pfaff, Rethinking the Standard for Preliminary Relief (working
paper, 2002).
21
These measurements are not necessarily in dollars. For instance, in a dispute over the legality of a pet
tiger, the court might determine that the fear felt by neighbors in the absence of a restraining injunction
would be twice as significant as the lost companionship felt by the pet owner in the event of a restraining
injunction.
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The conventional answer is that it should not. If the injunction issues, there will still
be a 40% chance that defendant will win. If that happens, the court will have wrongly
imposed a harm of 200. Multiplying the probability by the gravity, the expected harm
from issuing the injunction is therefore 80. By contrast, if the injunction is denied, there
is a 60% chance that plaintiff will win. In that case, the harm wrongfully imposed will be
100, meaning that the expected harm from denying the injunction is 60. Because 80 is
greater than 60, on these numbers the court should deny the injunction, even though that
means that the court will be wrong in 60% of the cases. The likelihood of error goes up,
but the expected cost of error goes down.22
III. WHY UNCERTAINTY MATTERS
The analysis presented thus far mirrors the conventional analysis of preliminary
relief in that it focuses on the possibility that the court might err with respect to its
prediction on the merits but ignores the possibility that the court might also err with
respect to its estimate of the parties’ relative harms. As I pointed out in the Introduction,
this is a significant oversight. Uncertainty with respect to these magnitudes is one of the
main reasons why courts offer preliminary relief in the first place. Besides, at the
preliminary hearing stage, everything is uncertain since there is almost always more
evidence yet to come. My purpose in this Part is therefore to consider whether the
standard analysis changes once uncertainty with respect to plaintiff’s and defendant’s
harms is acknowledged.
The answer turns out to depend on what it means to say that a court is uncertain.
Under one interpretation, uncertainty means that the court speaks in terms of
probabilities, but that those probabilities are known with confidence. That is, given the
evidence, the court knows for sure that there is, say, a 40% chance that plaintiff’s harm is
250 and a 60% chance that plaintiff’s harm is 225. This is an uncertain result in the sense
that the court does not know whether the harm is 250 versus 225, but it is certain in the
sense that the court knows for sure the specific probabilities associated with each possible
outcome. In cases where this is what uncertainty means, the standard approach to
preliminary relief works as traditionally stated. The probabilities known to the court
represent the best information available, and the optimal decision rule should use that
information in exactly the same way it would use a value known with precision.
There is another interpretation of uncertainty, however, and where it applies
uncertainty cannot be ignored. Under this interpretation, an uncertain value is a value that
22

We can generalize this tradeoff using some simple notation first suggested by Judge Posner in
Hospital Supply Co., 780 F. 2d. at 593. If we use P to represent the probability that plaintiff will win on the
merits, Hp to represent plaintiff’s irreparable harm, and Hd to represent defendant’s irreparable harm, a
court should issue an injunction whenever
P x Hp > (1 – P) x Hd
or, less formally, whenever the expected harm from denial outweighs the expected harm from issuance. We
can solve the Posner equation for P*, the critical probability above which injunctions should issue. That
cut-off is simply
P* = Hd / (Hd + Hp).
As expected, the lower plaintiff’s relative irreparable harm, the more likely it must be that plaintiff will
succeed on the merits. Conversely, the higher plaintiff’s relative irreparable harm, the less likely it must be
that plaintiff will succeed on the merits.
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different courts would estimate differently even given the same evidence, or,
equivalently, a value that a single court would estimate differently given the same
evidence on different occasions. This is exactly what happens when, for example, a group
of people try to guess the number of pennies in a jar. Each looks at the same evidence and
yet each offers up a different estimate. If the guesses are unbiased, they might converge
toward the right answer; but any specific guess can be too high or too low. As applied to
the court example given above, this might mean that four out of every ten courts would
think plaintiff’s harm was 250, while the remaining six would think that plaintiff’s harm
was 225. Or it might mean something more complicated—for instance, that half the
courts would think there is a 45% chance that plaintiff’s harm is 250 and a 55% chance
that plaintiff’s harm is 225, while the other half would think that the percentages were
35% and 65%, respectively. The insight, again, is that on this interpretation of
uncertainty, courts might on average converge to the same estimate as before, but any
court in isolation can overstate or understate the harm.
To see the implications of this type of uncertainty, consider a simple example drawn
from everyday life. Suppose that you value an evening at the theater anywhere from $0 to
$300, with your exact enjoyment varying with such factors as your ability to identify with
the main characters and your sense of the theater’s acoustics. For simplicity, let us
assume that your valuations are distributed uniformly, meaning that if you were to choose
a play at random, you would be just as likely to enjoy it at the $300 level as you would at
$210, $145, $0, or any value in between. Suppose, however, that on this particular night
you are not choosing a play at random but have instead asked a friend for advice. Your
friend has only partially internalized your taste for theater, so his advice is helpful but
imperfect. Indeed, to keep things simple, assume that when he predicts your enjoyment
for a given play, his guess is guaranteed to be within plus or minus 50% of your actual
enjoyment, uniformly distributed on that range. So, for a play that you would actually
enjoy at $20, your friend is equally likely to guess anywhere from $10 to $30, and for a
play you would enjoy at $100, your friend might guess anywhere from $50 to $150. On
this particular evening, your friend reports that he just saw a new production of Ibsen’s
The Wild Duck and he thinks you would enjoy this play at value $45. Tickets are $50.
The question you face is whether to go to the theater.
This example makes use of the second interpretation of uncertainty given above: On
average your friend predicts accurately, but any particular prediction is equally likely to
overstate or understate your valuation. The rest of the problem maps to the legal issue at
hand. Your expectations about the theater are similar to the court’s expectations about the
magnitudes typically associated with various irreparable harms. Your friend’s imperfect
advice corresponds to the court’s imperfect interpretation of the evidence. Lastly, your
decision about whether to go to the theater matches the court’s decision about whether to
issue the injunction. Both you and the court are looking to define the optimal decision
rule by which to make your decisions, and in both instances the question is whether
uncertainty affects the optimal decision rule.
If your friend were perfectly accurate in his predictions, the optimal decision rule
would have you purchase a ticket only in instances where his prediction is greater than
the price of the ticket. That is, you would purchase a ticket any time your friend predicted
your value to be greater than $50. The surprise here is that, given uncertainty, this is no
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longer the correct rule. Indeed, in this example, the correct decision rule has you
purchasing a ticket whenever your friend predicts a value of $41 or more.
The mathematics are presented in the Appendix, but what drives this result is the fact
that the variance associated with your friend’s guess changes with your real valuation.
That is, when your real valuation is $40, your friend’s guess is within plus or minus $20,
but when your real valuation is $50, your friend’s range increases to plus or minus $25.
This is perfectly natural. For instance, if you were right now to attempt to guess the
number of M&M candies contained in the average single-serving bag and also the
number of individuals living in the state of Indiana, your guesses might both be within
30% of their respective right answers, but your error range for the number of candies
would be plus/minus 10, while your range for Indiana would be over two hundred
thousand times larger.23 In short, in most situations involving estimation, variance
increases with the underlying actual value.24
Because variance is not constant, some of your friend’s guesses contain more
information than others. Suppose, for example, that your friend predicts a value of $30
for the play. Hearing that, you would know that your actual valuation is somewhere
between $20 and $60.25 The friend’s prediction thus narrows the range down to 40
different values. By contrast, if your friend predicts a value of $39, your real value can be
anywhere from $26 to $78, a range of 52 different values.26 The latter guess, then,
contains less information about your true value than does the former. This difference in
the information contained in the various guesses ruins the symmetry that would otherwise
have caused error to drop out of the problem. Your friend is indeed equally likely to
guess too high and too low, but those probabilities do not offset because high guesses and
low guesses carry different amounts of implicit information.
Note that the same basic dynamic applies even if for some reason variance decreases
with increases in the underlying value. For instance, suppose that, instead of purchasing
theater tickets on the advice of a friend, you are thinking of purchasing an expensive
painting on the advice of a collector. We had assumed that the friend’s estimates would
be within plus or minus 50% of the actual value, no matter what that value. But this
assumption probably does not work well for an art collector. Instead, an art collector’s
advice is probably more accurate for high-value works than it is for low-value ones
because high-value works are of interest to a larger number of buyers, and those
competing bids surely help the collector to more accurately estimate value. A $20 work
thus might be valued anywhere from $0 to $40, while an $80 work might be more
accurately predicted to be in the $75 to $85 range.27 The optimal decision rule still shifts
23

There are approximately thirty candies in each bag, and approximately 6 million people currently
living in Indiana.
24
In some instances, variance decreases in response to increases in the underlying value. For examples,
see infra note _ and accompanying text.
25
Because the friend is guaranteed to guess within plus/minus 50% of the real value, a real value of $20
is the smallest real value for which a prediction of $30 is possible. Similarly, a real value of $60 is the
highest real value for which a guess of $30 is possible.
26
A real value of $26 is the lowest value that can still lead to a guess of $39. A real value of $78 is the
highest value.
27
We can capture this in the model by assuming that a work of value $x will be reported with error of
plus or minus $400/x. Note that this sort of assumption might apply to litigation. After all, litigants spend
more money—and hence courts likely have better information—when high value harms are at stake.
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under this assumption, but in the opposite direction. Whereas last time you should have
purchased the $50 theater ticket any time your friend predicted its value to be $41 or
more, this time you should purchase a $50 painting only if the collector predicts its value
at $56 or more.28
One might object to the above analysis by arguing that, knowing all this, the art
dealer and the friend will adjust their predictions. The friend, for instance, will not tell
you his guess of $45, but will instead run through all this math in his head and report to
you a different figure that already takes uncertainty into account. That is possible, but
unlikely. After all, if you the reader cannot tell by inspection what that new figure should
be—the correct answer is that a guess of $45 should be interpreted to be a predicted value
of approximately $55—the assumption that the friend knows what adjustment to make
probably credits him with too much economic sophistication.29 Let alone courts. That
said, this sort of question has generated a lively debate in other settings. For instance,
economists are split over whether auction participants still fall victim to the winner’s
curse, or whether instead modern bidders adjust for it ex ante by optimally lowering their
bids.30 Without empirical evidence, there is no way to answer these sorts of questions.
Either way, however, in this instance the core insight remains: Uncertainty matters, and
maybe the decision-maker but more likely the decision rule must account for it.
The implications of all this are significant not just for the decision regarding
preliminary relief but, more broadly, for decision rules throughout the law. For instance,
state and federal agencies frequently evaluate programs and policies under the rubric of
cost/benefit analysis. The correct decision rule is assumed to be that programs should be
rejected in cases where costs exceed benefits. But what happens if the above model of
uncertainty applies? Uncertainty is pervasive in agency decision-making. When the
Environmental Protection Agency considers ordering the removal of pesticides from a
river bottom, for instance, the costs might be known with some accuracy but the agency’s
estimate of the benefits is surely a stab in the dark. Adjustments to the nation’s air quality
standards likely put both costs and benefits into play. Worse, as Cass Sunstein reminds
us,31 even seemingly precise data are in actuality uncertain given how difficult it is to
achieve consensus on the correct reading of empirical evidence.32
28

As one might expect, if variance is constant—plus or minus some constant k no matter what the real
value being estimated—symmetry is restored and the decision rule is again unaffected by uncertainty.
29
It is possible that, even without understanding the phenomenon, the friend will learn over time to
adjust his guess appropriately. After all, if he adjusts even once by mistake, his prediction in that instance
will be more accurate, and that success will encourage him to adjust again in the future. This is true even
though he might not understand why the adjustment helped in the first place. This kind of story seems
particularly plausible as applied to the art dealer, since art dealers receive precise feedback as to the quality
of their predictions in the form of how much the market is willing to pay for their services. It seems less
likely as applied to courts, however, since a judge will rarely see precise feedback as to the quality of his
damage estimates.
30
See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 191 (1988) (surveying the empirical
and theoretical literature).
31
Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
32
Uncertainty is a topic of serious interest in the cost/benefit literature. For a variety of views, see
Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 1037, 1043 (2000); Matthew
D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165, 216-38 (1999); Bernard
Goldstein, Risk Management Will Not Be Improved by Mandating Numerical Uncertainty Analysis for
Risk Assessment, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1599 (1995).
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Similarly, in tort law, Judge Learned Hand famously proposed that an injurer should
escape liability only where the marginal cost of any remaining precaution is greater than
the expected reduction in the probability of harm multiplied by the expected loss.33 That
certainly works if all of those quantities are known with certainty. But, again, what
happens when we acknowledge that different courts likely read the same evidence
differently? And how does that result interact with other forms of uncertainty—for
example the court’s uncertainty about the level of care actually taken by a given
defendant,34 or the defendant’s uncertainty about the level of care required?35
The list of possible examples here is long. Every algebraic decision rule must be
rethought in light of uncertainty. This is not to say that these rules should be discarded.
Quite the opposite, with very little information we were nevertheless able to account for
uncertainty in the theater example, and we can similarly account for uncertainty in other
settings, too. The point is that uncertainty cannot be ignored. Decision rules that are
optimal when all values are known precisely are not necessarily optimal in the face of
uncertainty. This means changes need to be made to cost/benefit analysis, the Hand
formula, and, as I discuss below, the standard by which courts evaluate motions for
preliminary relief.
IV. RETHINKING THE STANDARD
The conventional approach to preliminary injunctions focuses on one type of
uncertainty, namely uncertainty as to the proper outcome on the merits. Courts account
for this uncertainty by considering both the likelihood that plaintiff will win on the merits
and the relative harms to which plaintiff and defendant are exposed. My point thus far has
been that this balance introduces a second type of uncertainty into the analysis—
uncertainty with respect to the magnitudes of those harms—and that the decision rule
must be re-optimized to account for it.
Admittedly, doing that is a tricky business. One part of my on-going work on this
topic is to try to understand how different types of uncertainty can be integrated into the

33

This is technically a version of Hand’s formula based on marginal effects instead of absolute ones, an
adjustment to Hand’s original articulation that is now routinely made. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas
Ulen, Law & Economics 313-16 (3d ed., 2000). For Hand’s original statement, see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
34
See Jason Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Liability
under Uncertainty, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 137 (1987) (pointing out that this type of uncertainty leads courts to
sometimes find liability even in cases where adequate precaution was taken, thereby giving rational injurers
an incentive to minimize this risk by taking excessive care); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal
Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 99 (1989) (studying how this
uncertainty affects the incentive to bring lawsuits).
35
See Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 965 (1984) (arguing that the effect varies depending on assumptions about the type of uncertainty
generated by the legal system, the penalty structure associated with violations of the legal rule, and so on);
Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 279 (1986)
(expanded mathematical treatment). See also Mark Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of
Negligence, 92 Yale L. J. 799, 809 (1983) (assuming that “injurers make small errors” in estimating the
required level of precaution, and examining the implications of this error when combined with other sorts
of information limitations).
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conventional balancing approach.36 If it turns out to be clear that the legal standard
should be (say) higher than that currently employed, courts can be encouraged to shift
their decision processes accordingly. Similarly, if it turns out that uncertainty means that
the modern rule overreacts to perceived differences in the harms facing defendant and
plaintiff, courts can be encouraged to put less weight on those harms and correspondingly
more weight on the court’s prediction as to the outcome on the merits. The results do not
have to be mathematically precise; even the current standard is more of a verbal intuition
than a mathematical calculation.
That is not the end of the analysis, however, as there are three additional wrinkles
that also have implications for uncertainty. First, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a judge will not issue a preliminary injunction unless plaintiff is willing to
post a bond, set by the court, equal to the court’s estimate of the harm facing defendant.37
The purpose of this bond is to ensure that there are funds available to compensate
defendant in the event that the injunction turns out to have been wrongly issued.38 But the
bond also has implications for court error. For instance, suppose that in a given case the
judge overestimates all irreparable harms by 30%. The standard decision rule would still
lead this judge to resolve the question of preliminary relief correctly since those
overestimates cancel out.39 The overstated bond, however, might cause plaintiff to
decline even a correctly offered injunction, since plaintiff will not necessarily be willing
to take on the (overstated) financial exposure. The requirement that plaintiff post a bond,
then, changes both the likelihood of an errant result and its expected magnitude.
Second, in cases where the court denies plaintiff’s motion for preliminary relief,
defendant is still liable for any legally cognizable harm imposed on plaintiff during the
pendency of the litigation. The fact that there is no injunction does not mean that, say, a
firm sued for patent infringement can infringe with impunity from the time the case is
filed until it is resolved. Instead, any ultimate damage award will account for harms
imposed both before and during the lawsuit. The court’s uncertain estimate of plaintiff’s
irreparable harm thus has implications beyond just the decision of whether to grant
preliminary relief. For instance, too high an estimate of plaintiff’s possible harm not only
makes the injunction more likely but also more strongly discourages defendant from
causing those harms in the absence of an injunction. Like plaintiff’s bond, then,
defendant’s possibility of ultimate liability must be accounted for in the analysis of court
error.
Third and finally, just as plaintiff can in certain cases pay a bond and in that way
trigger an injunction, defendant can in certain cases violate an issued injunction and then
pay a fine. That is, while preliminary injunctions are typically phrased as if they are
mandatory commands by the court enforced through the threat of incarceration, in
practice the penalty for violating an injunction is sometimes just a hefty cash fine.40 In
36

See Douglas Lichtman & John Pfaff, The Implications of Legal Uncertainty (working paper, 2002).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
38
For discussion, see Erin Morton, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions
to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 Hastings L.J. 1863, 1866 (1995).
39
This is easy to see in the second Posner formula, supra note _: multiplying each term in the fraction
by 130% would leave the ratio unchanged.
40
For discussion, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
775-812 (3d. ed. 2002).
37
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those instances, the fine is yet another factor that must be accounted for in the analysis of
uncertainty because it is a safety valve for court error. For example, in a case where the
court has significantly underestimated defendant’s harm and thus wrongly issued an
injunction, defendant can respond by violating the injunction and incurring the financial
penalty. If that penalty is wisely set, this could be the equivalent of efficient breach, and,
as such, it might decrease the importance of court error.
V. CONCLUSION
It is common to assume that, if courts are equally likely to overestimate or
underestimate a given value, uncertainty can be safely ignored. The main contribution of
this Essay is to challenge that assumption by showing that, under one intuitive
interpretation of uncertainty, even unbiased error does not drop out of the analysis. I have
applied this insight in particular to the standard by which courts evaluate motions for
preliminary relief. As I have noted, however, this same point has implications throughout
the law, applying in any instance where decision-makers today take their best guess at
some value and use that guess as part of an algebraic inequality. That roughly describes
several important decision rules, including the Hand formula and cost/benefit analysis.
Open issues obviously abound. As applied to preliminary relief, I have pointed out
that plaintiff’s obligation to post a bond, defendant’s possible liability for actions taken in
the absence of an injunction, and defendant’s option of violating an issued injunction all
affect the likelihood and magnitude of court error under various decision rules. More
broadly, there is the empirical question of how courts actually address uncertainty in
various instances, a question that will help to distinguish settings where this model
applies from settings where it is inapt. This Essay, then, is best understood as the start of
a broader research agenda on uncertainty. Comments are welcome.
APPENDIX
The theater example can be solved using Bayes’ Rule which states that the
probability that two events will both occur is equal to the probability of the first event
occurring given that the second occurs, multiplied by the probability of the second
occurring.41 More formally,
(1) P[ A, B ] = P[ A | B ]P[ B ] = P[ B | A]P[ A] .

In our example, we would like to know the probability that the performance will be
worth x given that the friend predicts y. Bayes’ Rule tells us
(2) P[ x, y ] = P[ x | y ]P[ y ] = P[ y | x ]P[ x ]

or, rearranging,

41

SHELDON ROSS, A FIRST COURSE IN PROBABILITY 62-72 (3d. ed., 1988).
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(3) P[ x | y ] =

P[ y | x]P[ x]
.
P[ y ]

To find the decision point above which tickets should be purchased, we have to
account for the possibility of every real value for x on [0, 300] as well as the net gain or
loss associated with that value. The net gain or loss is simply the value minus the ticket
price.
Define the critical recommendation, y*, to be the cutoff above which the expected
payoff from ticket purchase is zero or greater. We know that
300

(4)

∫ P[ x | y ]( x − 50)dx = 0
*

0

which we can rewrite using Bayes’ Rule as
300

(5)

∫
0

P[ y * | x]P[ x]( x − 50)
dx = 0 .
P[ y * ]

Given our definition of uncertainty, P[y*|x] equals (1/x) for all x in [(2/3)y*, 2y*], but
zero elsewhere. Of course, 2y* cannot exceed the upper bound, which in this case is 300.
P[x] is a constant thanks to the uniform distribution. P[y*], by contrast, equals
300

(6)

∫ P[ y

*

| x]P[ x]dx .

0

Solving, we find that under these assumptions the left-hand side of (5) is increasing
in y* over the relevant ranges and thus equation (5) is satisfied only when y* equals
approximately 41. Note that this answer is not particularly sensitive to the boundary
conditions. For instance, raising the upper bound from 300 to 1000 does not change the
solution, nor does lowering the bound from 300 to 100.
The same basic mathematics can be used to solve the art dealer problem. Under that
error assumption, P[y*|x] equals (x/800) for all x in [(y + sqrt(y^2 – 1600))/2, (y +
sqrt(y^2 + 1600))/2] but zero elsewhere, again subject to the constraints that the
maximum value for x is 300 and the minimum value for x is 0. In that case, y* solves to
approximately 56.
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